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THE RELEASE OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED TECHNICAL
DATA UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
LAW: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
JAMES A. DOBKIN"
O N JULY 4, 1966, President Johnson signed into law Senate
Bill 1160 which amends section 3 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.' Commonly known as the "Freedom of Information Law,"
the new section, which became effective 1 year from its date of enact-
ment, represents 10 years of effort by congressional leaders to provide
the public with an effective means of extracting data from federal
administrative agencies.2
As enacted, the new section provides, inter alia, that "each agency,
on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published
rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute,
and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly avail-
able to any person."' There are nine exemptions to that prescription
which exclude matters that are:
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and prac-
tices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or let-
ters... ;
t Captain, United States Army, Office of the General Counsel (Patents), Head-
quarters, United States Army Materiel Command. B.Ch.E. (Nuclear), Polytechnic
Institute of Brooklyn, 1961; J.D., New York University, 1964; LL.M., Georgetown
University, 1968. Member of the New York Bar.
The author wishes to thank Mr. S. Joseph Rotondi of the Office of the General
Counsel (Patents), Headquarters, United States Army Materiel Command, who
advanced some of the initial ideas for this Article, read the Article, and contributed
valuable suggestions. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the view of any other person or the Department of Defense.
1. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (1964) (codified by Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1968)). For a discussion of the effect of this Law on
discovery proceedings in tax litigation see Murdoch, Discovery Against the United
States in Civil Tax Proceedings, 13 VLL. L. Riv. 58, 93-96 (1967).
2. See H.R. Rtp. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. Rzp. No. 1497].
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).
(74)
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses except to the extent available by law... ;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, includ-
ing maps, concerning wells.4
While the purpose of the Freedom of Information Law - namely,
to expose the functioning of government to the public in general by
requiring full disclosure of information except for specific, limited
exemptions' - is clear, equally clear is the language of the Law which
requires prompt availability of all nonexempted records to any person.6
A problem arises with respect to information which falls within the
literal wording of the Law, but not within its purpose. This problem
can best be demonstrated by examining the application of the new Law
to a narrow, yet increasingly common, fact pattern.
The hypothetical case of ABC Company will serve as a vehicle
for the discussion. ABC Company writes to a field installation of the
Department of the Army requesting all available drawings for 36,000
BTU airconditioners. ABC is neither a government contractor nor a
prospective bidder. In fact, ABC's letter indicates that the drawings
are sought solely for private commercial exploitation. Several of the
more than 100 pertinent drawings, though acquired through a research
and development contract with a private concern, contain no express
restrictions on government use. Further, for the purpose of the im-
mediate discussion, the following assumptions will be made: that the
data requested by ABC Company does not fall within the enumerated
exemptions; that the mandate that information be made "promptly
available" prescribes reproduction and provision rather than mere
accessibility; 7 and that accedence to the request will not interfere with
the mission of the affected facility. The applicability of the specific
exemptions and the possible interference with the mission of the affected
facility will be discussed below.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. III, 1968).
5. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
S. RAP. No. 813]; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 12.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).
7. See H.R. RP. No. 1497, at 8-9.
FALL 1968]
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
A literal reading of the new section in vacuo seems to force the
conclusion that the Government will be constrained to furnish any
and all information in its possession. Moreover, there are some that
might argue that the Law is clear and unambiguous and, therefore,
that consulting the legislative history is improper. None the less, in
the words of Mr. Justice Holmes:
If Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a
more limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common
practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when
we come to interpret a statute in which the phrase is included.'
Accordingly, it is proposed that numerous references in the
legislative history of section 3 prove that the section was promulgated
to expose the executive machinery and that disclosure of substantive
data unrelated to agency function is beyond the intent of the legis-
lators; the status of such data should be unaffected by the new Law.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE NEW SECTION
The gravamen of the old section 3 was to require "agencies to keep
the public currently informed of their organization, procedures and
rules." 9 In 1945, Senator McCarran, then Chairman of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, reported to the Senate that the section had
been "drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and
procedures are public property which the general public ...is entitled
to know . . . ."1 However, the section permitted suppression "in the
public interest" or for "good cause found," and prescribed disclosure
only to persons "properly and directly concerned therewith."" By
giving the agencies the discretion to interpret those criteria, the Law
became a ground for denial rather than for disclosure of information.
In purpose, the new section 3 is identical to the old section. The three
criteria for denial have been omitted. Therefore, it would seem that
the depth of the pool of information sought to be sounded by both
sections is the same; only the plummet has been redefined.
Consider the following statements reflecting on the expected and
intended purpose of the new Law: "The bill, it is believed, may make
it easier to find out how members of regulatory bodies vote and to
get access to . . . administrative procedures of Federal Agencies."' 2
"[W]hat we are aiming at ... is sound administrative procedures in
8. Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
9. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, ATT'y G4N. MANUAL 9 (1947).
10. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 198 (1945) (emphasis added).
11. See H.R. ReP. No. 1497, at 1-2.
12. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1966, at 25, col. 3 (emphasis added).
[VOL. 14 : p. 74
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW
the interest of effective administration ... ."" The taxpayer has the
right "to know how his money is being spent; to know how public
business is conducted; the reasons for decisions that affect the. lives,
businesses and future of our people."' 4 "The people only control their
Government so long as they have a voice in its decisions; and if this
voice is to be meaningful and constructive, the people must have a way
of informing themselves of governmental activity."' 5
[O]ur system of government is based on the participation of the
governed . . . We must remove every barrier to information
about - and understanding of - Government activities con-
sistent with our security if the American public is to be adequately
equipped to fulfill the ever more demanding role of responsible
citizenship.
S. 1160 is a bill which will accomplish that objective by
shoring up the public right of access to the facts of government
and, inherently, providing easier access to the officials clothed with
governmental responsibility."6
"[T]he public is entitled to all possible information about the activi-
ties, plans and the policies of the Federal Government." 7 "Threats
to cherished liberties and fundamental rights are inherent in the rela-
tively unchecked operations of a mushrooming bureaucracy .... [N]6
citizen will be denied full access to data that may be of crucial im-
portance to his case . . .
Determined resistance to the clearly expressed will of Con-
gress has forced us to bring more pressure to make a reality
the right of the people to know what their Government is doing.
13. Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1965) (statement of Robert M. Benjamin, American Bar Ass'n)
(emphasis added).
14. Hearings on H.R. 5012-21, 5237, 5406, 5520, 5583, 6172, 6739, 7010, and 7161
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 111 (1965) (statement of John H. Colburn) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 5012]. See id. at 114 (statement of John H. Colburn) ("conduct of
public affairs") ; id. at 119 (remarks of Richard D. Smyser) ("agency's workings") ;
id. at 129 (remarks of Creed Black) ("what is going on"); 112 CONG. REc. 13,642(1966) (remarks of Congressman Moss) ("workings of the Federal Government") ;
id. at 13,643 (remarks of Congressman King) ("information relevant to governmental
activities") ; id. at 13,647-48 (remarks of Congressman Laird) ("essential informa-
tion as a citizen and taxpayer"); id. at 13,648 (remarks of Congressman Fascell)("policies and activities") ; id. at 13,652 (remarks of Congressman Shriver) ("ordinary
business of their Government") ; id. at 13,653 (remarks of Congressman Rumsfeld)("evidence of official government action") ; REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM. STATEMENT ON
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LEGISLATION, S. 1160, May 18, 1966, reprinted in 112 CONG.
REc. 13,648 (1966).
15. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 165 (statement of Senator Edward V. Long,
sponsor of S. 1160) (emphasis added).
16. 112 CONG. REC. 13,641 (1966) (remarks of Congressman Moss).
17. Id. at 13,642 (remarks of Congressman Moss).
18. Id. at 13,645 (remarks of Congressman King).
FALL 1968]
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This bill . . . will remove the umbrella under which bureau-
crats may hide.
This provision gives an opportunity to correct erroneous inter-
pretations and applications of the statute which may be applied
by the individual in Government service.' 9
With this legislation, it would be possible for the citizen to take
recourse against arbitrary administrative decisions. He could
demand and receive information on decisions made at the Federal
level. With this information he could more adequately challenge
arbitrary bureaucratic acts.20
Procedures, operations, activities, malfeasance, administration, con-
duct, decisions, workings - each are words used by the legislators
to describe the target of section 3; each is an administrative function
logically falling under the aegis of the Administrative Procedure Act."'
In other words, the "right to know" cited in myriad instances through-
out the legislative history, 22 is the right to know what the agency is
doing and how it is doing it.
Whether an agency must disclose information should depend, not
on who is seeking the information nor why it is sought, but rather
on the nature of the information itself. Under the new Law, if the
information sought is related to the function of the agency, it must
be disclosed unless it fits under one of the exemptions.2" If no such
relation is found, it would appear that the purpose of the Law would
not require the information to be disclosed.24
19. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 167 (statement of Senator Frank E. Moss)
(emphasis added).
20. Id. at 169 (statement of Senator Lee Metcalf) (emphasis added). See id.
at 168 (statement of Senator E. L. Bartlett) ; id. at 170 (statement of Senator Thomas
L. Ashley).
"Administrative information" and information permitting the individual "to
find out how his government is operating" are words used in H.R. RVP. No. 1497,
at 6, by the House Committee on Government Operations. See also id. at 12 ("public
information about Government activities"); S. R P. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-3 (1965).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
22. See, e.g., 112 CONG. R9c. 13,641-44 (1966).
23. There is evidence that Congressman Moss's subcommittee realized that the
context of the Administrative Procedure Act might restrict the application of the
bill. See Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 34 (colloquy between Benny Kass, counsel, and
Norbert Schlei). For that reason it was thought by many that the Housekeeping
Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), would be the more appropriate vehicle. If nothing else,
that the Administrative Procedure Act finally became host to the subject provisions
tends to prove that the promulgators intended the restrictions inherent in that Act.
Cf. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 103 (colloquy between Benny Kass and Robert
Benjamin).
24. In one of the first of the few cases interpreting the new Law, Judge Alexander
Holtzhoff stated:
[The purpose of the Law] was to prevent Government agencies from unjustifiably
withholding information that should be reasonably available to a person having
some basis for seeking it. That this must have been the intent of Congress appears,
first, from the rather limited grant of power. It is granted only as to identifiable
[VOL. 14 : p. 74
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In the hypothetical, whether ABC is entitled to access to the
drawings depends upon whether the drawings are functional or non-
functional. If the agency refuses to disclose the information, the
burden is upon it to justify such action by showing that the informa-
tion sought is nonfunctional.25 Unfortunately, the line between func-
tional and nonfunctional is not always clear. For example, while
information on the airconditioners in the field installation of the
Department of the Army might, at first, appear to be nonfunctional,
that same information might be considered functional if sought by
someone who was trying to determine the procurement practices of
the Department of the Army. It should be carefully noted, however,
that the distinction is not made on the basis of who is making the
request, but rather on the basis of how this information is related to
the function of the agency. At times, far-fetched relationships may be
raised in order to gain access to information held by an agency. It will be
up to the courts in a case-by-case analysis to draw the line between func-
tional and nonfunctional, as it does in similar situations in other areas.
II. INTERFERENCE WITH THE MISSION
If the broad provisions of the new section are deemed to apply to
requests like that of ABC Company, will the burden placed on the
Government by accommodating ABC affect the applicability of the
Law? The need for effective government has been acknowledged to be
at least as great as the need to know.2" In the case of the Department
of Defense, for example, it can be argued that accomplishment of the
Department's mission outweighs many other considerations. For rea-
sons equally peculiar to DOD, how much of a burden on an installa-
tion is too much should not be the subject of legislation. The determi-
nation lies in the realm of military preparedness; only the affected
facility can judge its own effectiveness. Although leaving such a con-
clusion to the discretion of the agency interjects into the new Law one
objectionable criterion of the old section, a balancing of the interests
in defense circumstances seems to warrant the risk.
The promulgators of the new section were well aware of the
problem. In the words of Representative Moss:
[W]e certainly intend that this [disclosure requirement] be
reasonable, the Government not be put to any heavy costs or
records. Secondly, it appears from the exceptions, which are almost greater
than the grant.
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D.D.C. 1968) (emphasis added).
While it is not clear from the opinion what the court was referring to when it spoke
of a "basis" for seeking the information, as discussed in text, the "basis" should be
related to the nature of the information rather than the person's reason for requesting it.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).
26. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 1 (statement of Congressman Moss).
FALL 1968]
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extra costs in compiling specialized information, [and that dis-
closure be required of only] that which is available conveniently.
We are not asking here that there be a requirement imposed
upon the agencies and departments that they go in and compile
27
exhaustive data for a person who might just be curious .... .
Although several legislators suggested charging fees to eliminate any
burden,2 Congressman Moss acknowledged the pragmatic difficulty
inherent in too broad a reading of the statute: "I just [want] to make
[it] clear that we are not asking here that you marshal up an army
of new clerks to start gathering information. ' 2  President Johnson
concurred when he signed the bill: "There are some who have ex-
pressed concern that the Language of this bill will be construed in
such a way as to impair Government operations. I do not share
this concern."30
The above remarks were directed at government operations, in
general, and at the provision of information which unquestionably
qualify as records. As applied to the Defense Department, in par-
ticular, and to material such as technical data, the status of which under
the new Law may be hazy, the statements assume greater emphasis.
It seems, therefore, that the degree of effort necessary to retrieve,
reproduce, and provide data should be used as a rule of thumb to
define what data must be furnished and what data is impliedly excepted
from the the new section. 1 One element that should be included in
the application of this "rule of reason" would seem to be the expense
and effort that the party seeking the information is willing to under-
take. For example, if compliance with the Law would seriously en-
cumber government operations, a requirement that the party provide
his own means of reproduction should be upheld.
27. Id. at 61 (remarks of Congressman Moss). It should be understood that
what is being here discussed is not the reproduction and provision of several sheets 'of
drawings. It is not uncommon to receive a request for 8,000 documents. Moreover, if
the records are to be used for evidentiary purposes, each sheet must be certified as an
authentic copy. It is conceivable that a single system could involve 50,000 drawings.
28. See, e.g., H.R. R4P. No. 1497, at 2.
29. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 62 (remarks of Congressman Moss) (emphasis
added).
30. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1966, at 24, col. 5.
31. See Machin v. Zuchert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), in which the court of
appeals proposed that to the extent a disclosure of information interferes with an
important government function, such information should be treated as privileged. The
court was concerned primarily with the content of the information sought rather than
with the physical burden which might be imposed on the agency. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that the broad principle of the case could be applied to situations where dis-
closure, regardless of content, would interfere with an important government function.
[VOL. 14: p. 74
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III. THE SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS
It would seem at first that the exemption providing for with-
holding trade secrets and privileged or confidential items is applicable to
documents of the type under discussion. The terms "privileged" and
i'confidential" have been judicially expanded32 to include many items
which would not qualify under classical legal definition. Consistent
with this trend is evidence in the legislative history of the new Law
that Congress intended "privileged or confidential" to be interpreted as
that which "would customarily not be released to the public by the
person from whom it was obtained."33
The Attorney General, in his memorandum providing guidelines
for the implementation of the new Law, states:
An important consideration should be noted as to formulae,
designs, drawings, research data, etc., which, although set forth
on pieces of paper, are significant not as records but as items of
valuable property. These may have been developed by or for the
Government at great expense. There is no indication anywhere in
the consideration of this legislation that the Congress intended, by
subsection (c), to give away such property to every citizen or
alien who is willing to pay the price of making a copy. Where
similar property in private hands would be held in confidence,
such property in the hands of the United States should be covered
under exemption (e) (4).34
The Department of Defense directive"3 accords with the Attorney
General's suggestion. Under the "privileged or confidential" exemp-
tion, four categories of material are listed, one of which is:
(iv) Information such as research data, formulae, designs,
drawings, and other technical data and reports which:
(a) Are significant as items of valuable property ac-
quired in connection with research, grants, or contracts.
(b) Would likely be held in confidence if owned by
private parties. 6
32. See, e.g., id.
33. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 41. In discussing the term "trade secrets" in
another context, however, the court of appeals stated that "it is well settled that
detailed manufacturing drawings . . . are prima facie trade secrets." A.H. Emery
Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. ATV'Y GEN. MEM. ON THE PUBLIC INVORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 34 (1967).
35. Department of Defense Directive No. 5400.7, 32 C.F.R. § 286 (1968).
36. 32 C.F.R. § 286.8(b) (4) (iv) (1968). By eliminating any requirement of
"confidence," the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's exemption is even
broader than the DOD's. 14 C.F.R. §§ 1206.200-.205 (1968). See also the Atomic
Energy Commission implementation, 10 C.F.R. §§ 9.4-9.5 (1968).
FALL 19681
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Unfortunately, the Department of Army regulation,"7 which should
be based upon the DOD directive, seems to have missed the mark.
The regulation's counterpart to the above quoted passages exempts:
(4) Commercial information such as formulae, designs,
drawings, and other technical data submitted in confidence in
connection with research, grants or contracts.38
At best, the language of the regulation is confusing. None of the
Defense agencies accepts these types of drawings "in confidence."
Drawings and other technical data generated by research, grant, or
contract are acquired with either limited or unlimited rights for their
dissemination and use. Moreover, the regulation by referring to a
submission of the data seems to overlook the large body of data gener-
ated by the Government "in-house." Such data would be exempted
under the Attorney General's memorandum and the DOD directive.
Further, by requiring a submission in confidence, the regulation has
narrowed greatly the directive's prescription that the data only be
of a nature which would "likely be held in confidence if owned by
private parties.""9 It would seem advisable to amend the regulation
to bring it into line with the Defense Department directive, rather
than place Department of Army personnel in the difficult position of
trying to determine which document takes precedence.4"
Another exemption calls for withholding pursuant to executive
order "in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy."'"
There was concern during the congressional hearings over the possible
strict interpretation of that exemption,4 2 and a substitution of the much
broader term "national security" was suggested. Although not adopted,
frequent references throughout the legislative history indicate that the
authors of the section considered the words of the exemption tanta-
mount to "national security."4
We do not challenge that right to withhold for the national
interest, because we specifically require it by Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy. Now, that is very broad. That means that any of these
documents that are of sufficient significance to the security of this
Nation or to the interests of this Nation as it deals with other
37. Department of Army Reg. No. 345-20, 32 C.F.R. § 518 (1968).
38. 32 C.F.R. § 518.10(d) (4) (1968) (emphasis added).
39. 32 C.F.R. § 286.8(b) (4) (iv) (b) (1968).
40. It seems likely that the DOD directive, as a pronouncement of the higher
authority, would govern. Speaking pragmatically, however, the Army regulation,
because of its wider circulation in the field, might have a greater following.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
42. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 51 (remarks of Fred Smith).
43. See id. at 61 (remarks of Congressman Moss) ; id. at 99 (colloquy between
Congressman Monagan and Chisman Hanes).
[VOL. 14 : p. 74
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nations can, by appropriate designation, be excluded from the
provisions of this act.44
The public interest or national security is adversely affected by
indiscriminate disclosure of drawings in two ways. First, there is the
interference with the mission of the affected installation45 and, second,
there is the impact that such disclosure would have upon government
contractors who supply the bulk of the drawings in question. When
a contractor provides the Government with data pursuant to a contract
he expects that even data conveyed with unlimited rights will be used
only for governmental purposes. That policy has encouraged a free
and untrammeled flow of information. Any change in policy would
have several effects: the cost of research and development will rise,
inherently reflecting an increment for the disclosure of data formerly
withheld from the public; or less data will be given to the Government;
or more data will be restrictively labeled (in such case the Govern-
ment would again pay for the additional effort of dissemination and
marking). Even the supporters of the bill clearly manifested that it
was not intended that "information which would be prejudicial to the
Government, to its security, whether it be fiscal or military, be made
available to anybody.""
Two exemptions which, in combination, have bearing on the
present subject are those which encompass "investigatory files compiled
for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a
party"4 7 and matter "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.
48
"Investigatory files" include information compiled for the purpose of
civil litigation.49 But, rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
prescribes that a litigant must show "good cause" to obtain documents
from the adverse party. An anomalous situation arises when on one
hand the investigatory files exemption acknowledges the discovery
rules of federal litigation, and on the other hand the new section if
given broadest application would nullify those rules with respect to
the Government." Further, it is unreasonable to urge one rule for
litigation purposes and another for all other times; especially if the
44. Id. at 14 (remarks of Congressman Moss) (emphasis added). See also
President Johnson's comment that, "no one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy
around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest." N.Y.
Times July 5, 1966, at 24, col. 4.
45. See pp. 79-80 supra.
46. Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 61 (remarks of Congressman Moss) (emphasis
added).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b) (7) (Supp. II, 1968).
48. Id. § 522(b) (3).
49. H.R. Rtp. No. 1497, at 11.
50. See Hearings on H.R. 5012, at 166 (statement of Senator Sam J. Ervin).
See also id. at 57 (remarks of Fred Smith).
FALL 1968]
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1968], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
litigation rule is the more restrictive. It is reasonable indeed to try
to reconcile the two proclamations rather than deem one repealed by
the apparently inconsistent language of the other. Since it would seem
to give undue breadth to the language of the "disclosure by statute"
exemption to permit it to cover rule 34, which prescribes rather than
proscribes activity, to bring them into line the requirement of "good
cause" should be read into the new section.
An argument can be made that drawings in the possession of the
Department of Defense also qualify under the exemption covering in-
formation specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. 1 The only
statutes applicable to DOD and pertinent to the release of drawings
are sections 4506 and 9506 of title 10 of the United States Code.52
Those sections authorize the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force,
respectively, to sell, lend, or give drawings and manufacturing informa-
tion as they consider best for the national defense "(1) to any con-
tractor for . . . supplies under approved production plans; and (2)
to any person likely to manufacture or supply . . . supplies under such
plans.""5 The wording of these sections appears broad enough to
permit release to any present or prospective DOD suppliers. However,
the legislative history of an earlier statute,5 of which the cited sections
are codifications, casts light on the congressional intent behind sections
4506 and 9506. In a colloquy between committee members discussing
the original bill, one Senator voiced the fear that the terms of the
statute were so broad as to permit release of information generally,
whereas release was intended only in "anticipation of bid." He felt
that such a safeguard should be written into the bill to prevent viola-
tion of this intent by future Secretaries of War.5 It was finally
decided not to include the clause. However, it was stated to be the
intention, and so recorded, that release of drawings and other informa-
tion within the purview of the statute be made with that purpose in
mind. 6 In view of these congressional statements, it is evident that
the authority to release DOD drawings should be invoked only where
the party requesting them is participating in procedures which will
culminate in the award of a contract. Conversely, it would seem that
the same sections can be used as authority for the proposition that
DOD drawings may not be released to just anybody who may care to
possess them. Therefore, those drawings may conceivably fall within
the exemption for information exempted from disclosure by statute.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).52. 10 U.S.C. §§ 4506, 9506 (1964).
53. Id. Interestingly, the Secretary of the Navy has no equivalent authority.
54. Act of July 28, 1937, ch. 525, 50 Stat. 535.
55. 81 CONG. Rxc. 7211 (1937) (remarks of Senator Walcott).
56. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the arguments above, it is the firm belief of the
author that the public has a right to government-owned drawings and
should have a means for acquiring them. For the reasons presented,
however, it is submitted that the Freedom of Information Law is
inappropriate authority for forcing provision of the type of informa-
tion requested by ABC Company. The intent of the authors of the new
Law appears clear, and their admonition - "[w]e have expressed
an intent in the report on this bill which we hope the courts will read
with great care"5 7 - should be taken just as seriously by the public.
It is submitted that the purpose and reach of the new section are
consistent with the old. The language has been changed to put the
emphasis where it belongs - on disclosure, and to place the burden
of proof on the agency." Most importantly, the new section provides
judicial review59 - the teeth which were lacking previously. There is,
however, the minimum requirement that the information requested be
related to the function or operation of the agency.
Finally, it is suggested that releases of the type described which
might be authorized by other laws should be made through some cen-
tral facility such as the Department of Commerce Clearinghouse for
Scientific and Technical Information."0 In that manner a staff created
for that purpose and trained in the dissemination of information, with
all the safeguards required thereby, could accomplish expeditiously
what might be an unreasonable imposition on some administrative
agencies.
57. 112 CONG. Rgc. 13,642 (1966) (remarks of Congressman Moss).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).
59. Id.
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1151-57 (1964), which authorizes the Secretary of Com-
merce to maintain a clearinghouse for the collection and dissemination of scientific,
technical, and engineering information. The statute directs specifically that the Secre-
tary take steps to
make such information available to industry and business . . .and to the general
public, through the preparation of abstracts, digests, translations, bibliographies,
indexes, and microfilm and other reproductions, for distribution either directly or
by utilization of business, trade, technical and scientific publications and services.
Id. at § 1152(b). The military departments have complemented this statute with
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